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THE BEIRA PATROL
Britain’s Broken Blockade against Rhodesia
Richard Mobley
Between 1966 and 1975, the Royal Navy, primarily, conducted one of themore unusual blockades of modern history—a maritime-intercept opera-
tion that became known as the “Beira patrol.” The Royal Navy and Air Force
monitored shipping in the Mozambique Channel in an attempt to ensure that
no oil reached landlocked Southern Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe) via the port of
Beira, in the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. Although the military executed
these operations skillfully, Britain’s overall oil embargo against Rhodesia, which
had unilaterally declared its independence in 1965, failed. Well aware of oil
“seepage” to Rhodesia, London did not (and could not) extend maritime inter-
ception operations to other ports in Mozambique or elsewhere. On the other
hand, it refused to abandon a mission that was, because of substantial and grow-
ing resource constraints, increasingly unpopular within the Navy. The Beira pa-
trol had become too visible a component of London’s
commitment to the maintenance of United Nations
sanctions against its rebellious colony. Whitehall (that
is, the British government) would relieve the Ministry
of Defence of this mission only when Mozambique
gained independence from Portugal in 1975 and
could credibly assure the UN that no oil would cross
its territory to Rhodesia.
Today, in the light of dozens of recently declassified
British documents, the Beira patrol is a cautionary
tale for states that must decide upon, and command-
ers who must then orchestrate, maritime interception
operations. It illustrates the challenges of shaping an
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appropriate force for maritime sanctions and shows vividly how demanding
even a small blockade can be, especially if prolonged. It reveals the difficulties of
fashioning credible rules of engagement and the complexities of the interplay
between rules and force posture. It also exemplifies the legal, resource, and polit-
ical obstacles to modifying a blockade once it has started.
Most important, Britain’s experience in the Beira patrol demonstrates that
the symbolic utility of naval forces can be compelling in unforeseen and unwel-
come ways. Implementing a naval blockade with carriers, frigates, and
land-based aviation, Britain established a dramatic and public commitment to
sanction enforcement. But the use of such highly visible forces (ultimately man-
dated by an unusual, British-crafted UN Security Council resolution) had a
downside—Whitehall found it awkward to cease or reduce maritime intercep-
tion operations when it might have wished to do so. Diplomatic objectives con-
sistently outweighed Ministry of Defence protests that the patrol had become of
questionable utility and that demands upon naval resources were dispropor-
tionate. Because warships off Beira were such powerful symbols, the Royal Navy
found itself in an open-ended campaign. A prisoner of its own Security Council
resolution, the United Kingdom could not end its maritime sanction enforce-
ment—however ineffectual—as long as it remained committed in principle to
sanctions against Rhodesia.
THE “UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE”
The Beira patrol originated from a dispute between the United Kingdom and its
increasingly rebellious colony, Rhodesia. In 1964, the two northern portions of
the colonial Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland achieved independence as
black majority–controlled states—Malawi (once Nyasaland) in July and Zambia
(the former Northern Rhodesia) in October. London anticipated that the whites
of Southern Rhodesia, who controlled the colony although they constituted a
small minority of its population, would attempt to preempt the domestic and
international pressure for black-majority rule by establishing Southern Rhodesia
as a white-controlled state. Prime Minister Harold Wilson of Britain outlined in
October 1964 his government’s preconditions for granting the colony inde-
pendence: a guarantee of unimpeded progress toward majority rule; guarantees
against unconstitutional amendment of the 1961 constitution (a document that
had implied movement toward majority rule); an immediate token of improve-
ment of the political status of Africans; progress toward cessation of racial dis-
crimination; and agreement on a settlement acceptable to the entire population,
using a general referendum or similar device.1
Instead, on 11 November 1965, Salisbury (later Harare, the capital of South-
ern Rhodesia), issued a “Unilateral Declaration of Independence,” asserting the
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existence of the sovereign state of Rhodesia, under Prime Minister Ian Smith.
The Security Council retaliated on 20 November with a regime of voluntary
sanctions.2 UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 217 called on all mem-
bers of the United Nations to withhold recognition of Rhodesia, refuse assis-
tance to its government, sever economic relations with Salisbury, and embargo
petroleum shipments to the rebellious colony.3 This resolution was to serve as
the original (if flimsy) legal justification for later British maritime intercept op-
erations, giving the United Kingdom reason to expect the cooperation of the flag
states of suspect tankers.4 In December, London banned selected imports from
Rhodesia and prohibited the export of British oil to it.5
Unwilling to invade its colony, Britain publicly forswore outright military in-
tervention, thus eliminating a potential tool for coercion. Indeed, Wilson at first
ruled out (in a statement of 21 December 1965 to the House of Commons) even
a blockade of products going to Rhodesia. Believing that a potential oil boycott
by certain Middle East producers and cessation of oil exports by government-
controlled British companies would be sufficient, the prime minister did not
then intend to submit an oil-blockade resolution to the United Nations.6 In-
stead, the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office sought to for-
mulate a strategy of limited sanctions to erode Smith’s domestic white,
middle-class support. London would ultimately declare a series of unilateral
sanctions and also support several UN sanctions that gradually increased pres-
sure upon Salisbury.
Unfortunately, London had other, conflicting objectives as well, especially a
desire to lure Rhodesia back into the colonial fold. Whitehall therefore sought to
treat its problems with Rhodesia as a conflict between metropole and colony.
Even when urging UN involvement in the dispute, London would discourage
multilateral military action against Rhodesia or any extension of sanctions to
Rhodesia’s backers in white-ruled South Africa and Mozambique. However, a
major bloc in the UN, comprising especially the newly independent African and
Asian states, wanted military measures taken directly against Rhodesia, along
with expanded sanctions. Britain attempted to blunt such initiatives; a regime of
economic sanctions, particularly maritime, would become Britain’s way of con-
taining the international repercussions while pressuring its colony. This over-
arching desire to limit the dispute would later lead Wilson’s cabinet to reject the
Defence Ministry’s own plans to extend the blockade.
“ACTIVE AND URGENT STEPS”
Even before the naval blockade was started in March 1966, the British bureau-
cracy sent mixed signals about the utility of sanctions against Rhodesia. In Octo-
ber 1965, the Joint Intelligence Committee (the United Kingdom’s highest
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estimative body) advised the political leadership that even a full trade embargo
would “not in itself [have] crippling effects on the Rhodesia economy.”However,
the committee also suggested that prolonged and severe economic pressure
“might in time induce the white electorate to throw out the rebel government.”7
Prime Minister Wilson, for his part, had high hopes that these sanctions
would work. On 7 January 1966, he told the Jamaican prime minister that sanc-
tions were “beginning to bite.” He estimated that in three months the rebels
would at least rescind the unilateral declaration of independence and reconsider
their stance on minority rule.8 He made an even bolder prediction in a convoca-
tion of Commonwealth foreign ministers on 10 January 1966—that the cumula-
tive effects of economic and financial sanctions might well bring the rebellion to
an end “within a matter of weeks rather than months.”9 Wilson based this
prediction on several factors: feedback he was seeing in the Rhodesian press, a
presumption that South Africa and Mozambique would honor the British sanc-
tions in order not to escalate the crisis, and optimism that Zambia would agree
to freeze the movement of goods across its territory to and from Rhodesia.10
As Wilson made these optimistic statements, nevertheless, the Foreign Office
was beginning to look at the possibility of a maritime embargo. On 7 January, as
an aside to a statement that Britain had no formal contingency plan for a block-
ade, it observed that the carrier HMS Eagle and two frigates were near Mombasa,
Kenya, and could be available for such a task within days.11
This early planning proved prudent. The government’s grounds for optimism
were dashed during the first week of February, when British press reports of
tanker-truck shipments of oil from South Africa to Rhodesia raised serious
questions about South African neutrality and the possible effectiveness of oil
sanctions. Rhodesia had in the past received oil through three primary routes: by
road, across the Beit Bridge from South Africa; by rail, through Mozambique
from either South Africa or the port of Lourenço Marques (now Maputo); and
by pipeline, carrying crude oil from Beira to the Rhodesian refinery in Umtali.12
The prime minister became increasingly frustrated over the oil “seepage” into
Rhodesia by land. On 16 February Wilson directed his personal secretary to is-
sue a warning to key cabinet departments: “The Prime Minister is very con-
cerned about reports in the press which indicate that the oil embargo in
Rhodesia is being circumvented with increasing effectiveness. . . . [T]here is
clearly very serious leaking in the oil sanction machinery. . . . [T]he Prime Minis-
ter’s view is that the oil leakage into Rhodesia is serious, must be taken seriously
and he hopes that the Departments concerned will take active and urgent steps
to have it stopped.”13
Two days later, the foreign secretary, Michael Stewart, warned Wilson that
the black African states might push for more “urgent” sanctions in view of the
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continuing oil flow into Rhodesia. Indeed, they might raise the issue at the UN at
any time.14 Against this backdrop, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Britain’s senior
purely military decision-making body, opined on 24 February that “pirate”
tankers could arrive in Beira “un-noticed.” In response to a request from an in-
teragency Rhodesia contingency steering committee, the committee directed
that a maritime surveillance plan be prepared for submission to the prime min-
ister. This would be no mere planning exercise; the likely operational com-
mander would prepare the plan, which would involve both surface and air
components. Headquartered in Aden, Middle East Command would control the
operation until relieved of this responsibility by Far East Command in May
1967. The committee had in mind Majunga (now Mahajanga), in the Malagasy
Republic (as Madagascar called itself from its independence in 1960 through
1975), as a staging base for Shackleton maritime patrol aircraft.15
In other words, oil smuggling had become the issue of the day, and the naval
blockade planning effort was about to get a big push. Later in February 1966 the
Rhodesian crisis as a whole developed a maritime flavor when the British gov-
ernment (and the world press) started to focus on tankers carrying oil for Rho-
desia. The Rhodesians themselves had set the stage. On 25 February, the
Rhodesian minister of commerce and industry had announced that a tanker
would arrive at Beira with oil for Rhodesia “in the foreseeable future.”16 Some
days later he predicted, “The day our first tanker arrives in Beira we shall have
won this economic war.”17 London had already received numerous reports of
tankers. Between 7 January and 1 March, Whitehall, working with a host of com-
mercial and intelligence sources, had investigated thirty-two reports and found
them to be “phantom tankers”—nonexistent or innocent.18
This mixture of Rhodesian public relations “spin,” rumor, solid intelligence,
and unwanted publicity forced Britain to “do something” to prove its commit-
ment to sanctions; on 1 March, accordingly, it established the Beira patrol. The
Royal Navy stationed the Rothesay-class antisubmarine frigate HMS Lowestoft
off Beira and directed it to prepare for intercept operations, to start on 4 March.
Gannet Mark 3 airborne early warning aircraft flying from the carrier HMS Ark
Royal (which had been diverted from a transit to the Far East) joined the search
in the Mozambique Channel on 6 March.19
The need for the patrol was immediately confirmed—the government soon
received evidence that two tankers might be making for Beira with crude oil for
Rhodesia. The Joanna V, a Greek-flag vessel, had been making an unusual voy-
age; after steaming from the Arabian Gulf to Rotterdam via the Suez Canal, it
had entered the Atlantic as if to return the long way, around Africa. Its Greek
owner, it developed, had contracted with a South African shipping agent to de-
liver a total of twenty-seven cargoes—about a year’s supply for Rhodesia—to an
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unspecified customer. A second tanker, the Manuela, was also reported en route
to Mozambique across the Indian Ocean from Bandar Mashur, Iran.20
Meanwhile, the Chiefs of Staff Committee was refining its arrangements and
prospects for success. On 8 March, in light of evidence it had received of con-
struction in progress of six oil tanks in Beira, the committee concluded that oil
had (as the Rhodesian commerce minister had already asserted) become em-
blematic—if oil reached Beira, sanctions of all kinds would appear to be failing.
The committee assessed, though, that Rhodesia already had sufficient oil stocks
to maintain morale even if Britain could impose an effective embargo.21
In a message on 10 March to the prime minister of New Zealand, Keith J.
Holyoake, Wilson elaborated on the criticality of the oil embargo, despite the ap-
parent policy turnabout it represented:
I am worried at the possibility of a dramatic breach in the oil embargo such as would
result from a tanker entering Beira with a cargo for Rhodesia. . . . [I]f a tanker were
to arrive we should face increasing pressure from African states for a Chapter VII [of
the UN Charter] resolution [i.e., authorizing the use of armed force] in the UN. It re-
mains our view that we should try and avoid this. If we once admit that Rhodesia is a
threat to peace, there is no knowing where we may find ourselves. . . . Nevertheless,
we recognize that the pressure for a Chapter VII resolution would probably be irre-
sistible and our aim would have to be to channel it in a direction of an embargo
solely directed to oil supplies for Rhodesia.22
The Commonwealth Relations Office elaborated on this objective in a mes-
sage sent to British embassies worldwide in early April:
Our immediate and urgent purpose is to obtain authority to prevent the arrival at
Beira by vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil to Rhodesia. . . . You should,
therefore, emphasize importance of our decision which reflects determination of
British government to end rebellion in Rhodesia as soon as possible. There will no
doubt be pressure to extend the resolution, e.g., to cover South Africa in relation to
the oil embargo, and possibly to extend other economic sanctions generally. . . .We
have already approached the South African government with the object of persuad-
ing them to modify their policy vis-à-vis Rhodesia and so avoid a confrontation be-
tween themselves and the United Nations. If this approach is to have any prospect of
success we must avoid reference to South Africa’s position in the Security Council.23
SURVEILLANCE, INTERCEPTION, AND DETERRENCE
The initial British commitment of naval forces soon comprised a carrier, two
frigates—Lowestoft and HMS Rhyl—and a logistical support ship. If the carrier
had to depart station, the Royal Navy would deploy a third frigate. Either Ark
Royal or Eagle would have patrol responsibilities until 25 May 1966, when Brit-
ain eliminated the requirement for a carrier. For the remaining nine years of the
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blockade, a succession of Royal Navy “small boys”—two destroyers or frigates at
any one time (until the last months of the operation)—carried the burden of the
surface blockade.
The warships, operating twenty to forty miles off Beira, were to intercept sus-
pect tankers that had been detected by shore-based maritime patrol aircraft,
upon which they would rely, once the involvement of carriers ended, for surveil-
lance, alerting, and vectoring.24 Difficulties in securing basing rights, however,
delayed the participation of maritime patrol
aircraft; France rebuffed Britain’s request to
use Majunga. The British Middle East Com-
mand accordingly prepared to launch patrol
aircraft to the Mozambique Channel all the
way from Mombasa, Kenya.
Meanwhile, during the blockade’s first two
weeks, Ark Royal, Lowestoft, and Rhyl steamed
in the Mozambique Channel. Ark Royal’s Gan-
nets searched out to 350 miles from Beira.
When they gained radar contact, the carrier
sent Buccaneer strike aircraft or Sea Vixen
fighters to investigate. In this way, tankers were
typically detected fifteen hours before they
could reach Beira. As discussed below, in the
early weeks of the operation London was re-
quired in that time to approach the tankers’
flag countries and arrange to stop and board
the ships, if necessary; with the passage in April of Security Council Resolution
221, Britain would no longer have to secure this approval, and early airborne de-
tection would become less critical.25
On 16 March the French relented, and by 19 March a detachment of three
Shackletons was flying daily single-aircraft patrols from Majunga, at first com-
plementing the carrier-based patrols and then replacing them.26 Although in
1969 the Royal Air Force was to reduce the Shackleton detachment from three to
two aircraft, the Navy would enjoy dedicated maritime air support until 1971.27
At first, each Shackleton flew daily twelve-hour missions, normally from 6
A.M. to 6 P.M. local time; in June 1966, the patrols dropped to three a week. The
bombers would fly at maximum speed along the shipping lanes to the northern
end of the Mozambique Channel and then south to a point fifty miles south of
Beira. Radar was their primary sensor; it covered a swath between forty and sixty
nautical miles on each side of track. When the Shackletons acquired contacts,
they would fly over them to investigate.28 The aircraft were required to report the
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location, course, speed, and identity of all tankers, bulk carriers, and warships
sighted to the officer in tactical command—the senior Royal Navy warship com-
manding officer present. (The officer in tactical command might order a surface
unit to investigate, but only the Ministry of Defence could authorize it to stop or
divert a suspect tanker.) The aircraft were also to notify that commander should
they sight any previously designated “suspect tanker,” any tanker not on the
weekly “innocent list,” or any tanker on the list that was apparently steaming for
Beira after having declared for another port. In such a case the officer in tactical
command would send a “flash” (highest-precedence) report to the Ministry of
Defence.29
The Defence Ministry prepared a comprehensive press release to be issued in
April 1966. It noted that aircraft from Ark Royal and Eagle had flown by then
nearly a thousand surveillance sorties. Four different frigates and destroyers, as
well as seven auxiliaries, had supported the operation. Three Shackletons had
been involved, each initially flying four hundred patrol hours a month.30 Al-
though the sortie rate soon dropped to only three missions a week, the
Shackletons still flew 220 operational sorties between March 1966 and April
1967.31 During the same period, the two carriers and seventeen other combat-
ants, in addition to Royal Fleet Auxiliaries (resupply vessels), had participated in
the patrol at one time or another.
The Middle East Command characterized the period starting in mid-June
1966 as the patrol’s “deterrent phase.” The military now hoped to deter future at-
tempts at oil-sanction “busting” by means of highly conspicuous surveillance
over the Mozambique Channel. “It would soon become common knowledge
throughout the merchant fleets that it was impossible to get through the Mo-
zambique Channel without being investigated by a Shackleton. They would
warn the frigates off Beira who would intercept and arrest with the probable loss
of an expensive cargo. The game was not worth it.”32
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
At least four sets of rules of engagement—issued by Flag Officer Middle East on
the basis of guidelines supplied by the Ministry of Defence—governed the Beira
patrol between 1966 and 1968. The successive changes were significant because
they reflected the evolution of British understanding of the legal basis of the op-
eration. With one early exception, the rules became successively tougher; even-
tually, following an embarrassing incident in 1967 involving the French tanker
Artois, London would authorize, if all else failed, gunfire directly at a tanker’s
bridge.
The first set of rules, issued on 15 February, delineated the responsibilities of the
blockading ships. Flag Officer Middle East instructed his frigates that if ordered
7 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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to intercept a tanker bound for Beira, they were to direct it to another port. If the
vessel did not comply, the commanding officer was to take a series of escalatory
steps, including firing shots across the bow and training guns directly at the ship.
A boarding party might then be sent to order the master to divert; if he refused,
the party was to “take over ship with minimum force” and steam it out of the
area.33 To preclude untoward incidents, however, Flag Officer Middle East also
warned that none of these actions would occur before the United Kingdom had
secured permission from the tanker’s flag state. The patroller’s only initial action
would be to interrogate and shadow the tanker until Britain secured this approval.
Reviewing this plan, Prime Minister Wilson became concerned with ensuring
that the Royal Navy would scrupulously respect the limits of British authority un-
der international law, particularly in light of the voluntary nature of Security
Council Resolution 217. Speaking through his personal secretary on 11 March,
Wilson warned that “before any action to intercept is taken the consent of the flag
state should have been obtained.” He also desired that commanding officers be
given a “clear understanding that any force used must be kept to a minimum.”34
Defence Ministry guidance to Flag Officer Middle East had assumed that a
tanker’s flag state had given Britain permission to divert the ship. A week after the
prime minister expressed his concerns, the Defence Ministry modified its guide-
lines; now, if a tanker refused to turn away when challenged, a boarding party
would warn the master, in the name of the vessel’s flag state, to change course. If
that did not work, a shot across the bow was authorized. Gone was any option of
commandeering the ship. Indeed, if a tanker absolutely refused to comply, the
warship could only escort it, and then only to the Mozambican six-mile territorial
limit. In other words, the tanker could proceed to Beira unhindered.35
These modified rules of engagement tightened up considerably when the UN
Security Council passed Resolution 221 on 9 April 1966. The unusual voyage of
the Joanna V, which had drawn British attention in early March, had ended on 5
April in a highly embarrassing way—the Greek-flag tanker had entered Beira af-
ter all, unmolested, under escort by the frustrated HMS Plymouth, and with
wide publicity. The day before, still at sea, the frigate had attempted to persuade
Joanna V to go to another port; Greece having refused permission to divert it,
Plymouth could not use force.36 Consequently, it was the Royal Navy that was de-
terred, before the watchful eyes of the world press.
Whitehall’s legal advisors still warned that Britain would be liable if it at-
tempted to force a diversion without permission of the flag state. They added
on 7 April that use of force must be in accordance with an appropriate Chapter
VII resolution. That same day, the Commonwealth Relations Office sent a
flash-precedence message to British embassies that Britain would seek an
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emergency meeting of the Security Council to obtain UN authority to use
force to stop vessels carrying oil to Beira.37
Over the next several days the United Kingdom lobbied furiously in the
Security Council for a new resolution that would give a stronger legal basis for
its embargo. It argued that continued seaborne deliveries of oil were a threat to
peace, because if sanctions failed, violence might erupt in southern Africa. Brit-
ain argued that under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, preventing their failure
might justify the use of force. (The United Nations had used the provision only
once before, at the beginning of the Korean War.)38
The British drew up such a resolution, crafting it to limit the risk of escala-
tion. It confined the blockade to Beira only and specifically authorized only the
United Kingdom to employ force. For reasons that will be discussed below, the
Defence Ministry was leery of allowing other navies to participate. In the event,
the new resolution, passed as UNSCR 221, was to have the unintended and costly
effect of forcing the Royal Navy (aside from assistance for several years from the
Royal Air Force) to maintain the nine-year blockade entirely alone.
The resolution called upon Portugal “not to permit oil to be pumped through
the pipeline from Beira to Rhodesia” and “not to receive at Beira oil destined for
Rhodesia.” All states were to ensure the diversion of “any of their vessels reason-
ably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia which may be en route for
Beira.”39 The teeth of the resolution, however, were in paragraph 5, which
“[called] upon the Government of the United Kingdom to prevent by the use of
force if necessary the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying
oil destined for Rhodesia, and empower[ed] the United Kingdom to arrest and
detain the tanker known as the Joanna V upon her departure from Beira in the
event her oil cargo [was] discharged there.”40
With this resolution, the Defence Ministry liberalized, from the blockading
force’s viewpoint, the rules of engagement but continued to limit the use of force
to “the very minimum.” Ministry approval would still be required for diversion
of vessels, and the Royal Navy had to remain outside Mozambique’s territorial
waters. The Middle East Command acknowledged that the “resolution radically
altered the whole concept of our operations. With a tight ring of frigates around
Beira having authority to stop any suspected runners, the early warning to give
maximum time for diplomatic action was no longer essential.”41
The Royal Navy felt, however, that Mozambique’s six-mile limit was problem-
atic. Soon after the Security Council issued its new resolution, the Defence Min-
istry advised Prime Minister Wilson that it was possible for a tanker to transit to
Beira from Durban, South Africa, entirely within South African, and then
Mozambican, territorial waters; without authority to enter those waters, the
Navy would be unable to act. Fortunately, no “pirate tanker” ever tried to challenge
7 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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the Beira blockade in this way. Had one taken advantage of the territorial limits
of an unsympathetic power, the British blockade force would have been hard
pressed to stop it without creating an international incident.42
The new system stood until late the following year, when the French forced
the Royal Navy to reconsider what constituted “minimum force.” On 19 Decem-
ber 1967, HMS Minerva challenged the French-flag tanker Artois as it made for
Beira. Artois was not on the “innocent list,” so Minerva requested the ministry to
clarify its status. Meanwhile, the tanker continued to approach Beira. Minerva
signaled “Stop or I will open fire”; Artois refused. By the time London finally no-
tified the frigate that Artois could legitimately enter Beira, “because it was not
carrying oil destined for Rhodesia,”Minerva had already fired warning shots; the
tanker had ignored them and entered Mozambican territorial waters.43
Fearing that a smuggler might emulate Artois, the minister of defence, Denis
Healey, castigated the existing rules of engagement for “lack of precision”: “Not
only does it place an unfair burden on commanding officers to leave them in any
doubt about how far they are expected to go in the enforcement of their requests,
but it exposes the Royal Navy to the risk of international discredit should an ille-
gal tanker disregard the threat of force and be allowed to get away with it.” He
presented the cabinet with two options: restricting the Beira patrol simply to
identifying smugglers, or directing commanding officers to use disabling gun-
fire against tankers that failed to heed other warnings.44
The attorney general reviewed the proposal and gave as his opinion that the
Navy had to satisfy two criteria to remain within the bounds of UNSCR 221. The
force used had to be “necessary,” and the United Kingdom had to have a “reason-
able belief ” that the tanker was carrying oil consigned to Rhodesia. The attorney
general also opined that UN responsibility was political only—“Any legal re-
sponsibility would almost certainly fall on ourselves.”45
The foreign secretary, George Thomson, replied that Britain could reason-
ably meet both criteria. Though the Ministry of Power (the source of much of
the Royal Navy’s tanker-movement intelligence) had expressed “some anxiety”
about its ability to meet the second standard absolutely, the foreign secretary
concluded that it had taken “every possible precaution” to do so. Consequently,
he concurred with stiffening the rules of engagement and issuing a stern warn-
ing to the United Nations about what might happen to blockade runners.46
On 21 March 1968, the Defence Ministry informed the Commander in Chief
Far East (who, in Singapore, had assumed responsibilities as operational
commander of the Beira patrol from his counterpart in Middle East Command
in 1967) that the rules of engagement were being “clarified” and that UN mem-
ber states were being notified that blockading ships would “enforce their re-
quests to stop, if necessary by opening fire on the vessel.” The ministry directed
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the commander to issue new instructions immediately—if naval headquarters
at the Defence Ministry ordered that a tanker be diverted, the intercepting war-
ship was to challenge it. If the tanker did not stop, the frigate or destroyer was to
take a series of escalating measures: firing across the bow with small-arms trac-
ers, 20 or 40 mm shells, or a 4.5-inch (for a few ships, four-inch) round; then, ap-
proaching to point-blank range and warning that it would open fire; and finally,
firing surface-practice (that is, not high-explosive) ammunition at the ship’s
funnel. If these successive measures did not stop the tanker, the frigate was to fire
a series of antisubmarine “mortar bombs set shallow about one cable [some two
hundred yards] astern of the ship.” Finally, if all that failed, the unit was to “open
fire with 4.5/4" service ammunition at either the bridge or the engine room or
both and continue until the ship does stop.”47
The British delegation to the United Nations issued a warning to the member
states: “[Her Majesty’s] ships have been instructed that if their requests to stop
are not complied with they may enforce them, if necessary, by opening fire on
the vessel. The master of such a vessel would thus, by refusing to stop, put at risk
the lives of his crew and the safety of ship and cargo. . . . [A]ll member states will
take the necessary action to ensure that the masters of vessels subject to their ju-
risdiction are made aware of the terms of Security Council Resolution No. 221. . . .
[Her Majesty’s government] would also urge member states to ensure that oper-
ating companies subject to their jurisdiction give advance notification to any
[British] diplomatic or consular missions of a proposed call on Beira by an oil
tanker.”48
The new rules of engagement were apparently sufficient. After the Artois inci-
dent there were no more attempts to disregard the Royal Navy blockade of Beira
and no further major revisions to the rules of engagement.
FASHIONING A MORE EFFECTIVE BLOCKADE
The government and the vocal Conservative opposition were well aware that the
blockade was porous. In September 1966, the Secretary of State for Common-
wealth Affairs reported a “leakage” of 220,000 gallons of oil daily to Rhodesia;
under strict rationing, the self-declared nation required only two hundred thou-
sand.49 Considerable staff work was therefore devoted to making the blockade
tighter or to finding ways to share the burden with other navies. All such initia-
tives failed, for a variety of reasons. Some exceeded resources; for instance,
blockading both Mozambican ports capable of transshipping large quantities of
oil (Beira by pipeline, Maputo by rail) would be too demanding for the Royal
Navy. Others required confronting South Africa, a Commonwealth member, di-
rectly, or risking an expanded debate in the UN—neither of which London was
willing to do.
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As early as 1966, the Navy had calculated what forces would be needed to ex-
tend the blockade. To blockade all ports in Mozambique and South Africa would
require seven carriers and thirty escorts, which meant, allowing for rotation of
ships on and off station, at least sixty frigates.50 The Defence Ministry, for its
part, doubted that the entire UN could mount such an ambitious effort, U.S.
Navy assistance being unavailable due to the war in Vietnam.51 Even had the
forces been available, the United Kingdom lacked the political will for such a
grandiose operation. A member of the Foreign Office advised in January 1967,
“I must repeat what we have said in the past, namely that we think it is at present
outside of the bounds of political reality to envisage the need for such large scale
naval enforcement.”52
To blockade even only the two major Mozambican ports (Beira and Lourenço
Marques) would mean keeping six or seven frigates on station, for a total of be-
tween fourteen and seventeen if selected export sanctions were to be enforced as
well. A pessimistic ministry staff study warned the minister of defence that such
a force “would amount to the greater part of the total overseas frigate strength of
the Royal Navy and would go far to denude the Mediterranean, Middle East and
Far East stations.”53 The Royal Navy could stop oil going into the two major
ports, but the blockade would “not really bite since oil could still reach Rhodesia
via South Africa.”
Nevertheless, the United Kingdom continued to toy with the idea of an ex-
panded blockade. In March 1968, an internal Defence Ministry document noted
that whereas Rhodesia was still getting “all or more oil than it needs,” and
whereas Security Council Resolution 221 was still binding on Britain, the minis-
try was searching for ways to make the blockade more effective.54 The matter was
taken up also by the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, which was chaired
by the prime minister personally. The DOPC’s conclusions about expanding the
blockade to both major Mozambican ports were pessimistic; such an effort,
which would cost 1.5 million pounds monthly and tie up fifteen frigates and
four or five auxiliaries, would oblige the Royal Navy to abandon most of its other
worldwide commitments.55 In other words, despite early optimism, a compre-
hensive naval blockade against even Mozambique alone would be beyond the
Royal Navy’s capabilities.
A second approach considered was to request a commitment from Portugal
to guarantee that no oil would reach Rhodesia via the territory of Mozambique,
its colony. Lisbon had consistently challenged the legality (and binding nature)
of Security Council Resolution 221, and the United Kingdom saw little hope of
Portuguese cooperation. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office laid out a proposal in
which the Beira patrol would be suspended in return for such a commitment. In
March 1968, Whitehall again predicted that Portugal would not acquiesce in
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such a scheme unless the South Africans were willing to refrain from making
good Rhodesian shortfalls caused by loss of the Mozambique connection. It
seemed certain that the white-minority government of South Africa would not
cooperate; hence, the Defence Ministry concluded, “We cannot therefore count
on the acquiescence of the Portuguese.”56
The Foreign Office visited this scenario yet again in December 1969. This
time, the concept was to co-opt the Mozambique railways and pipeline
company—in return for financial compensation, they would agree not to tran-
ship oil to Rhodesia. To make the proposal attractive to the United Nations,
however, the foreign ministry sought and received prior agreement from the
Royal Navy to reimpose the blockade quickly should such an arrangement break
down.57 However, London proved unable to obtain the necessary agreement of
Portugal or commitments from the other parties that would have been involved.58
In addition, the idea of naval burden sharing arose several times during the
course of the blockade. There were inherent complications. UNSCR 221 autho-
rized only the United Kingdom to use military force to enforce the blockade; other
nations that might wish to participate would need to seek similar legal protec-
tion for their navies. That would reopen the UN debate about sanctions enforce-
ment and, because of the widespread hostility in the General Assembly to the
white Rhodesian regime, would risk widening the sanctions in ways Britain
wished to avoid.59 In any case, the Defence Ministry was ambivalent: “We cer-
tainly would not want to get involved with help from embarrassing sources, e.g.
[the] USSR, from whom it might be difficult to refuse any offers.”60 The ministry
saw no prospect that the UN would allow Britain to select its partners. It also
foresaw additional costs; Britain, it presumed, would be required to provide lo-
gistical support to units of foreign navies. In any case, the ministry was skeptical
that even “Old Commonwealth” navies could be persuaded to participate.61
Nevertheless, in June 1969 Prime Minister Wilson decided that the govern-
ment should consider inviting other countries (such as Canada) to participate in
the patrol.62 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (or FCO, as the previously
separate bodies were now jointly known) was “not entirely pessimistic” that the
Royal Navy might be able to secure naval assistance. The Defence Ministry did
not share this view. In November 1969, the FCO ruled out U.S. participation,
given its “full scale re-examinations of their policy in southern Africa—and of
their overseas commitments generally.” Sweden and Norway had the capability
to support the embargo and might be willing to do so, but the Foreign and Com-
monwealth Office felt that Western European Union countries should be ap-
proached first.63 However, the FCO soon cooled even to that possibility:
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The potential savings to our resources accruing from foreign participation in the pa-
trol between now and the completion of our withdrawal from the Far East at the end
of 1971 is not sufficient to outweigh disadvantages and to justify the substantial risk
inherent in such an initiative of embarrassment at the UN and of a rebuff from the
governments we approach. Financially, there would be a modest savings in foreign
exchange. Operationally, the weight of argument is against it; there might also be in-
creased difficulties of disengagement.64
Nonetheless, the FCO left open the option of approaching foreign navies as
Royal Navy force reductions made it increasingly difficult to maintain the block-
ade. The cabinet secretary echoed this prospect to Wilson in March 1970.65 None
of these approaches was fruitful.
“GETTING SHOT OF THE COMMITMENT”
However professionally the Royal Navy and Air Force conducted the blockade,
this inevitably ineffectual operation, conducted so far away from home, became
increasingly unpopular within the Defence Ministry. Indeed, many of the burden-
sharing initiatives discussed above were outgrowths of an underlying desire to
eliminate the commitment entirely. The ministry raised persuasive arguments
about the costs of the patrol for a nation that had decided to end its commit-
ments east of Suez. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, however, fought to
maintain the patrol because of its political visibility; the prime minister was to
endorse that position. As long as Britain attempted to reverse Southern Rhode-
sia’s unilateral declaration of independence, it would be committed to sanctions;
as long as it was committed to sanctions, it was tied to UNSCR 221 and the Beira
patrol.
Queried by the Commonwealth Office in February 1968 as to the costs of the
patrol, the Defence Ministry eagerly responded: “We are very willing to play our
part in an exercise [exchange of correspondence] which will give ministers a
broad indication of the savings to be had from stopping the Beira patrol. From
the Navy’s point of view the patrol reduces ship availability and it is not a task
from which we derive any great training value.”66 The ministry argued that
maintaining the patrol, particularly after 1971, would “greatly reduce” the na-
tion’s ability to respond to contingencies outside of Europe.67 Nevertheless, in
March 1968 the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee concluded that the time
“was not ripe” to end the patrol, although from the purely military view “one
should be glad to get rid of the tasks.”68 The DOPC concluded that the political
disadvantages of ending the patrol outweighed any financial gains or opera-
tional relief to be expected from its cessation.69 However, the committee agreed
to reconsider cessation of the patrol “if the balance of advantages changed.”70
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In November the Defence Ministry tried again, asking the Foreign and Com-
monwealth Office whether the Beira patrol could be ended unilaterally. The re-
ply was that the patrol would have to remain in effect until such time as
Parliament should grant Rhodesia independence.71 (In the event, Parliament did
not accede to a settlement of the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean issue, which was to be-
come wide-reaching and infinitely complex, until 1979.)
In May 1969, the Ministry of Defence again raised the cost issue and the risk
of “overstretching” the Navy’s frigate force. In a draft memo, the minister
pointed out that a total of six frigates was being required to maintain two on pa-
trol. He cited the low training value of the patrol, operational flexibility penal-
ties, the longer frigate deployments involved, the necessity of permanently
deploying fleet maintenance assets and, for all these reasons, a resulting lowered
standard of operational readiness. “There would be clear advantages in terms of
ship availability and operational flexibility if the patrol could be given up as
soon as possible. The operational penalties imposed by the task will be substan-
tially greater if it is necessary to continue the patrol after the withdrawal of our
forces from east of Suez.”72 The minister’s staff continued this refrain the next
month: “There is no training value in the patrol[,] for the Royal Navy and the
Royal Air Force aircraft cannot combine it with their antisubmarine role. Be-
cause oil products are patently reaching Rhodesia through other routes[,] the
men employed on the patrol cannot be expected to derive any satisfaction from
it and it is not a popular task with the Royal Navy.” The staff urged its minister to
push the sanctions bureaucracy to study ways and means of “getting shot of the
commitment.”73
In June 1969 the Defence Oversea Policy Committee agreed to review burden
sharing and ending the patrol, but it warned that the “present juncture is not one
at which we can afford to give the impression that we are weakening on sanc-
tions.”74 Nonetheless, the committee commissioned “in great secrecy” a parallel
study to investigate “unobtrusively” the prospects of ending “sanctions alto-
gether or at least reducing their scale and cost.”75 These studies were still under
way when in September 1969 Wilson made it clear that he was not about to
abandon the patrol—the patrol’s future “involves wider issues than those relat-
ing merely to defense.”76
In the next year the Defence Ministry was still unable to shake the political
leadership’s commitment to the patrol. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office
forestalled even a proposal to reduce the patrol temporarily from two to one
frigate that spring; elections in Britain were about to take place, and the govern-
ment required that two ships be kept on station. On 16 June 1970, the personal
secretary to the defence minister predicted, “Until the election is over, the political
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significance of the number of ships engaged in the patrol would make it ex-
tremely difficult to agree to any reduction.”77
The elections brought in a new government, that of Edward Heath and the
Conservatives. Despite rumors in the press, the new cabinet supported the Beira
patrol. In July 1970, the new foreign minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, con-
firmed that the United Kingdom would continue it.78 Ultimately, however, unal-
terable external factors—the elimination of the British military commitments
east of Suez in 1971 and reduction of the fleet—would force further reduction of
the resources committed to the patrol.
Although the Defence Ministry had lost its battle for a policy decision to
eliminate the patrol outright, the force itself was whittled down between 1971
and 1975. By the spring of 1975, the patrol was to be a shadow of the carrier, frig-
ate, and Shackleton force of 1966. The reduction occurred in several stages. In
March 1971, within a year of its election, the Heath government allowed the
Royal Navy to patrol Beira with one frigate instead of two. This relaxation pro-
duced a drop from 717 ship-days on patrol during 1970 to 354 ship-days in
1972.79
The patrol then lost its air component. In June 1971, the Malagasy Republic
asked the Royal Air Force to eliminate the Shackleton detachment at Majunga.80
Thereafter, because of an overall drop in the number of frigates in the fleet, the
Royal Navy was allowed to make the patrol intermittent; in 1973, the Navy as-
signed frigates to the station for only 161 ship-days (typically by diverting ships
transiting to or from the Far East).81 “Gapping” the patrol could be justified by
the argument that the Umtali refinery was inoperable; not having refined oil
since January 1966, the facility could resume doing so only after a lengthy
recommissioning process.
The Beira patrol finally wound down completely on 25 June 1975, the day
Mozambique became independent, having assured the United Kingdom that it
would not transship oil to Rhodesia. On that day HMS Salisbury went off sta-
tion, and the Royal Navy was finally off the hook. Whitehall was likely reassured
in this decision when Mozambique gained independence and then sealed its
border with Rhodesia in March 1976. Still, the effort had been demanding: seventy-
six Royal Navy ships had supported the patrol during its ten-year history. One
estimate placed total operating costs at a hundred million pounds.82
The Beira patrol, a useful case study of a unilateral approach to naval sanctions
enforcement, offers interesting lessons at several levels. For all of the ship-days
and aircraft sorties it required, the patrol appears to have accomplished remark-
ably little. During its heyday (March 1966–March 1971), the force intercepted a
total of forty-seven tankers bound for Beira. Of these, forty-two were allowed to
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proceed. The other five did not stop or were escorted from the area.83 Meanwhile,
as the government continuously documented, oil got through to Rhodesia from
South Africa and the port of Lourenço Marques. The Portuguese announced that
between April 1966 and May 1967, 169 tankers entered Lourenço Marques;
fifty-eight, the Portuguese reported, had flown the British flag.84
Yet the British government was convinced throughout that the patrol was
useful as a symbol of the nation’s commitment to sanctions against the separatist
Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith—a commitment London was obliged to sustain
by the legal box in which it had put itself in the UN. Because Security Council
Resolution 221, which Britain had drafted, mandated British military action, the
government (at least the Foreign and Commonwealth Relations Offices) consid-
ered the political costs of discontinuing the patrol greater than the concrete
costs of conducting it. Even the Defence Ministry acknowledged that Rhodesia
had to expend more foreign exchange moving oil by rail from Lourenço Mar-
ques than it would have had the Beira-Umtali pipeline been open.85
At the level of practice, the role of the news media proved critically impor-
tant. At first overconfident about the speed with which sanctions could take ef-
fect, the Wilson cabinet was forced to react rapidly in March and April 1966
when world attention focused on two “pirate tankers” steaming toward Mozam-
bique with oil for Rhodesia. Far more oil than such tankers carried was already
moving across land borders; nonetheless, the publicity given their approach
forced Britain to take action quickly or be accused of weakness.
Had the vessels’ arrival in Beira been discovered only after the fact, Whitehall
might have been able to draft a less reactive, more thoughtful Security Council
resolution. As it proved, Britain learned that while such a resolution can be the
ultimate stamp of international legitimacy, it can also be oppressively binding.
The United Kingdom felt naturally obliged to use its own navy to deal with its
breakaway colony, but the burden could have been made less painful at the on-
set. For example, British diplomats might have considered calling, in what be-
came paragraph 5 of UNSCR 221, upon all UN member nations, not just the
United Kingdom, to contribute military force to enforce the blockade. The
blockade, of course, would then not have been under total British control, and
ships of the Royal Navy might have found themselves steaming alongside those
of its nation’s adversaries. Nonetheless, had London realized that sanction en-
forcement would last so long, it might have welcomed participation by other
navies.
Inherently, a multinational force would have further complicated the formu-
lation of rules of engagement, a task that was difficult enough as it was. As vital
as rules of engagement are in all such cases to the credibility of sanctions en-
forcement, it took Britain time (and a Security Council resolution) to create a set
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sufficiently robust to allow its ships to stop “pirate tankers.” Even then, it was
shown that the blockade could be challenged with impunity, and the rules had to
be toughened again (in December 1967). Until that was done, and thereafter to
the extent that it could still be evaded, the Beira patrol gave the impression of
ineffectiveness.
Still, the most effective sanctions are not necessarily the most visible ones. If
Security Council Resolution 221 and the naval blockade it mandated did not re-
ally deprive Rhodesia of oil, they were only part of an array of United Nations
measures against Rhodesia that ultimately isolated Salisbury and drained the
Rhodesian economy. But the process took years, not weeks.
The Beira patrol represented Britain’s hurried response to a highly publicized
challenge from its breakaway colony of Southern Rhodesia. The patrol allowed
London to limit the escalation of a potentially volatile situation while providing
a credible demonstration of its commitment to sanction enforcement, which
was the course Whitehall wanted to pursue. The experience ultimately proved,
however, that Security Council resolutions—public and formal pronounce-
ments with the authority of the United Nations and the stature of international
law—can, when used as weapons, turn in the hands of their wielders. A resolu-
tion that had mandated a multinational response would appear to have been less
painful for the Royal Navy; it would also have allowed the patrol to be made
more effective by generating enough naval force to extend the blockade to other
ports. The flexibility offered by a more broadly conceived instrument would
have been worth the challenges of preparing and implementing it.
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